Abstract: Social tipping, where minorities trigger larger populations to engage in collective action, has been suggested as one key aspect in addressing contemporary global challenges. Here, we refine Granovetter's widely acknowledged theoretical threshold model of collective behavior as a numerical modelling tool for understanding social tipping processes and resolve issues that so far have hindered such applications. Based on real-world observations and social movement theory, we group the population into certain or potential actors, such that -in contrast to its original formulation -the model predicts non-trivial final shares of acting individuals. Then, we use a network cascade model to explain and analytically derive that previously hypothesized broad threshold distributions emerge if individuals become active via social interaction. Thus, through intuitive parameters and low dimensionality our refined model is adaptable to explain the likelihood of engaging in collective behavior where social tipping like processes emerge as saddle-node bifurcations and hysteresis.
Studies of collective behavior or action, such as protest demonstrations, responses to disasters or even revolution 1 , fosters an understanding of the formation and logic of the crowd [2] [3] [4] [5] . Broadly, the study of collective behavior can be separated into either those of social movements or temporary gatherings. Social movements are usually more structured around specific, identified goals, have deeper social connections between actors, are organized (generally to defend or fight against existing authorities) and persist over time (such as the civil rights movements) 6 . In contrast, gatherings (such as riots, sudden protests, concerts, sporting events) are more spontaneous, less organized, do not carry as deep of social connections between actors, and can be quite ephemeral 7, 8 .
Further, individual engagement in collective behaviors (such as changing consumption behavior or adoption of new technologies) can be connected to broader social processes, such as norms and expectations for behavior 9 . Specifically, individuals strategically control their actions in accordance with their norms in order to achieve their goals and objectives 4, 5, 10 . As such, norms and preferences structure an actor's likelihood to engage in collective behaviors, as well as its form of participation within these groups. Complex forms of collective behaviors (be it either a movement or a crowd) are thus created through dynamic interactions of actors that share common goals and objectives for a given social situation. For example, global climate change has been frequently noted as one prominent contemporary social problem that could trigger and might also be addressed through collective behaviour (such as the emergent 'Fridays for Future' 11 movement) 12, 13 .
Empirical evidence for such complex contagion of interlinked individuals that leads to collective action has been provided for both online 14- 16 and offline 17 social networks. Additionally, complex contagion has been experimentally shown to foster social tipping 18 , a process that has gained increased attention in the recent past 19 due to its potential for rapid societal changes with profound impacts on the entire socio-ecological Earth System 13, 20 .
Complementing empirical studies, recent conceptual models of complex contagion incorporate the spreading of an action, behaviour or trait through a complex network 21-23 . They often aggregate an individual's surrounding over time 24, 25 or abstract space 26 to accumulate exposure to a considered trait such that at a certain point the individual adopts that trait as well. Such models have been applied successfully to study processes involved in the spreading of opinions 27,28 , large-scale epidemics 23 , the adoption of life-style choices 29 or the collective behaviour of animal groups 30,31 . However, most such models of collective be-haviour are often tailored to a specific problem (both in the incorporated processes as well as the underlying parameter set) and are thus often not transferable to different and novel applications.
The Granovetter threshold model is a comparatively early contribution to this field, providing a core basis for subsequent and more contemporary modeling attempts 32 . This model aims to explain the emergence of collective behaviors while noting that individual norms and preferences are a crucial factor determining their development and final outcome. In particular, when presented with a simple binary choice to participate within a collective behavior or not each individual has a certain activation threshold for participation. This measures the proportion of the group that an individual would like to observe participating within the collective behavior before they are willing to join themselves. The thresholds emerge from the norms, preferences, goals and beliefs of each individual, e.g., representing a kind of trade-off between the costs and benefits of joining in the behavior. As such, the application of the threshold model, or variations thereof, is not limited to simple crowd-like behaviors, such as protests and riots, but is comparatively broad, encompassing collective behaviors e.g., voting 33 , diffusion of innovations 34 , or migration 35 , as well as classical social movements such as the Monday Demonstrations in East Germany 36 . However, while by design the model is very flexible, it has mainly been used for illustrative and theoretical purposes (including most applications outlined above), but hardly applied as a numerical modeling tool. This paper identifies two major sets of issues that prevent broader application of the Granovetter model and proposes extensions to resolve them. First, under often assumed threshold distributions (such as cut-off Gaussians 32 ) the model usually unrealistically predicts either no-one or the entire population to eventually act. We resolve this issue by drawing from real-world observations as well as social movement and resource mobilization theories 37,38 , extending the original model by classifying individuals as either certainly active, certainly inactive, or contingently active. This causes the model to display nontrivial equilibria in which a certain part of the contingent individuals become active. Second, the emergence and shape of the threshold distribution itself is often underexplained. Therefore, we utilize a conceptual network cascade model 26 and show that a broad (non-Gaussian) threshold distribution emerges from microscopic networked interactions in which potentially active individuals join an action if a sufficient number of their neighbors are also engaged.
By addressing both issues, we effectively separate (unique) individual preferences which determine general tendencies towards or against an action from the embedding of each individual into a larger social structure and corresponding exposure to external influences. Both characteristics then co-determine whether the individual ultimately joins into an action or not.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Sec. I introduces the formal specifics of the Granovetter threshold model and discusses in detail its aforementioned conceptual limitations. Sec. II implements the proposed solutions and present a refined threshold model that only depends on parameters that are readily observable in real-world systems. Additionally, we provide an analytical solution of the refined model and analyse its potential for modeling social tipping. Ultimately, Sec. III closes with a discussion of the results and an outlook to future work.
I. GRANOVETTER'S THRESHOLD MODEL
The threshold model assigns each individual in a population of size N a threshold that defines the number of others that must participate in an action before the considered individual does so, too 32 . In its discrete-time formulation the number of acting individuals at time t + 1, R(t + 1), is hence directly derived from the cumulative distribution function of thresholds in the population, F , such that R(t + 1) = N F (R(t)).
(1)
Note that the original exemplary application of the model was that of individuals' participa- In addition, if no individual has a threshold larger than 100%, the threshold model generally has a second typically stable fixed point at R * = N implying that the entire population has the potential to become active if only enough others do so, too, Fig. 1A . In reality, an individual may never engage an action regardless of how many others have already joined as personal preferences, norms or attitudes can restrict behaviours 9 . In its basic setup, the Granovetter model can only account for this by either assigning the concerned individuals a threshold of 100% or by selecting the population such that only those individuals that are generally in favour of a certain action are considered 32 . The first approach, however, implies that everyone would generally be willing to act if only enough other individuals become active before. The second approach requires updating the population and, hence, its size, whenever the norms and attitudes of an individual change. What both approaches have in common is that they imply a constant change of the threshold distribution whenever individuals alter their preferences or attitudes.
In Sec. II A we present a framework that accounts for the above issues by grouping individuals according to basic preferences that determine whether they certainly, contingently or never act. This circumvents the existence of trivial solutions and we show that this approach does not require a constant updating of the threshold distribution as a response to changing group memberships. Both traits and processes ultimately co-determine the macroscopic threshold that is exposed to the observer and we call these thresholds of the original Granovetter model emergent thresholds from here on. However, quantifying the emergent thresholds on the individual basis is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without any prior knowledge or assumptions on those microscopic characteristics and interactions. In addition, even properly justifying a certain shape of the emergent threshold distribution is a difficult task as it remains unclear to which extent different shapes follow from a certain composition of individual traits.
Notably, in analogy to the concept of emergent thresholds there should still exist on the micro-level a number or share of others that join into an action before an individual does so, too. However, this micro-threshold should not primarily be assessed with respect to the entire population, but mainly with regard to the relevant social surroundings of a considered individual 32,44 . Here, the micro-threshold is considered a fundamental trait of each individual, regardless of whether their preferences and norms favour or hinder a certain action. As such it disentangles social processes from non-social factors, such as individual preferences and norms. In contrast to the emergent thresholds, these micro-thresholds may not necessarily be widespread. Rather, they might be assumed to have a narrow distribution or correspond to fixed, intuitive points, e.g. 50% (majority rule) 45 .
In Sec. II B we present a microscopic version of the threshold model where individual preferences are assigned to each member of the population that then join into an action based on their micro-threshold applied to the neighborhood in their social network. We then show that such microscopic processes in fact yield an often postulated broad (but not normal-shaped) emergent threshold distribution.
II. RESULTS

A. Refinement of the Model
We start by addressing the first two issues identified above, namely that for the usually chosen distributions the original model predicts either no-one or the entire population to become active. As discussed above, one way to circumvent these issues is to assign certain individuals either a threshold of 0% or ≥100% such that some individuals certainly become active and others never become active 32 . This approach requires a constant updating of the threshold distribution and may be impracticable for many cases. As an alternative we suggest to divide the population of size N into three groups, namely: A < N certainly acting individuals, C < N −A contingent individuals and the remaining N −C −A certainly inactive individuals. The certainly acting and contingent individuals form the group of P = A + C potentially acting individuals. In a social movement and resource mobilization context, our three groups can for example be seen as representing adherents, potential supporters and those in opposition 37,38 .
If we have no reason to assume that the threshold distribution is different in the three groups, the original recursive formula Eq. (1) is then replaced by
The equilibria of the thus refined model are again obtained by computing the intersection of In order to also avoid having to redraw F in Fig. 1B whenever there is a variation in A or C, it is beneficial to rescale the ordinate to the unit interval, Fig. 1C . This allows us to find the equilibria for all possible combinations of A and P in the same diagram, by drawing F only once and just adjusting the diagonal to meet the points (A, 0) and (P, 1).
Our adjusted approach makes the application of the threshold model as an actual modeling framework more practical as it (i) produces nontrivial fixed points R * , (ii) requires the (B) If every node in the network is potentially active (p = 1), also an intermediate micro-threshold ( = 0.5, green) suffices to cause the entire population to act. In comparison with (A) one also observes that the transition observed for = 0.2 occurs already for smaller choices of a. For a large micro-threshold ( = 0.8, yellow) no abrupt transition appears such that r * ≈ a for all considered choices of a and p. and potentially acting population (P ). Recall that A directly relates to an immediate action or behaviour, while P denotes the general acceptance of or attitude towards that action.
B. Estimation of emergent threshold distribution
Having refined the threshold model to properly allow for the computation of non-trivial fixed points, we shift our focus to the second issue that relates to the threshold distribution itself. It has been established in Sec. I B that the emergent thresholds follow from microscopic characteristics of each individual as well as its embedding in a social context. Specifically for the latter it will turn out that the proportion of others that must join into an action before a contingent individual does so too need not be widely distributed or even heterogeneous at all across the population in order to produce a widespread distribution for the emergent threshold.
We now study how such characteristics and interactions on the micro-level determine one's emergent threshold by using a simulation model of social contagion that has been studied in the past to model binary decisions with externalities 26 . We represent each individual in the population by a node in a complex network and draw links between nodes to indicate their embedding in a social group of others (see Sec. IV A for details). This relates directly to the idea of a sociomatrix that accounts for the stronger influence that individuals to which one forms a social bond have on one's behaviour 32 . In agreement with the consideration put forward in Sec. II A we assume that P randomly distributed nodes form the potentially active population. Being potentially active subsumes all norms, preferences and attitudes that cause an individual to show acceptance for a considered type of behaviour. Among the P potentially active nodes we assume that A ≤ P randomly distributed nodes are certainly active. In each time step each of the remaining C = P −A contingent nodes i becomes active if more than a share ∈ [0, 1] of its immediate neighbors is already active. The number or active nodes at time t is again denoted as R(t). Setting a common value of represents the most narrow distribution of actual microscopic thresholds that determine whether one joins into action given that one generally supports that action at all.
We simulate cascades of nodes becoming active for two different shares of potentially active nodes p = P/N = 0.56 ( Fig. 2A ) and p = 1 (Fig. 2B ), as well as for different microthresholds ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. Fig. 2 shows the final share of acting nodes r * = R * /N after the cascade stops for increasing shares of certainly acting nodes a = A/N ≤ p. For p = 0.56 (i.e., a low share of potentially acting nodes) only small micro-thresholds ( = 0.2) allow for a large-scale cascade such that r * → p for values of a 0.05 ( Fig. 2A) . In contrast, for values of a 0.05 no cascade is observed and, hence, r * ≈ a. Larger micro-thresholds (i.e., = 0.5 or = 0.8) hinder the emergence of a cascade such that r * ≈ a for all choices of a ( Fig. 2A ). For p = 1, cascades are also observed at a larger micro-threshold of = 0.5 but are still suppressed for = 0.8 (Fig. 2B) . Furthermore, the required share of certainly acting nodes a at which the system tips from a state with no cascades to a state with a global cascade decreases slightly with increasing p (compare Fig. 2A and Fig. 2B ).
To estimate an emergent threshold distribution as required for the threshold model we Fig. 3 shows the results if the network cascade is close to equilibrium, i.e., for t = 0 or t = t max − 1, where t max is the time at which the cascade stops. We observe the formerly postulated broad distribution of emergent thresholds as a result of the microscopic interactions at narrowly distributed micro-thresholds ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} given a generally positive (P nodes) or negative (1 − P nodes) attitude towards the considered behaviour. This implies that individuals with a high emergent threshold may not necessarily be more reluctant to join into an action, it could simply mean that they are located at a more peripheral position in the network.
By approximating the number of active, a i , and inactive neighbors, b i , of a node i as coming from a common multinomial distribution that only depends on the number of neighbors k i = a i + b i and the overall number of active nodes R(t), we derive an analytical approximation of the emergent threshold distribution F (note that for brevity we omit the dependence of r(t) on t) as
Here, K = i k i /N denotes the average degree (i.e., number of neighbors) of nodes in the network (see Sec. IV B and the Supplementary Information for a full derivation of Eq. (3)). Note that the second factor in Eq. (3) can be further approximated by an incomplete Gamma-Function. We find that (close to equilibrium) Eq. (3) aligns very well with the network simulations. For the transient phase the approximation still estimates the emergent thresholds well for small and large choices of but decreases in quality for intermediate values (see Supplementary Information) . This is mainly caused by the clustering of active and inactive nodes. An extension of the above approximation that accounts for such factors, e.g., via pair approximations 46 , is beyond the scope of this work and remains as a subject for future research. In summary, Eq. (3) gives a good estimation of an emergent macroscopic distribution that fulfills the initially postulated broad shape 32 while emerging from a subsumed set of preferences as well as a single common micro-threshold . In addition, using a single distribution F has the advantage of being independent of the share of certainly and potentially acting nodes. As such it only needs to be estimated once while changing preferences (i.e., varying A/a and P /p) are incorporated into shifting the diagonal line that is used to estimate the fixed points (see again Fig. 1C ).
C. Comprehensive analysis and social tipping
From the approximate emergent threshold distribution F in Eq. (3) we estimate the fixed points r * of the refined threshold model for different choices of a, p (or c = p − a), and by solving (r − a)/c = F (r) (i.e., intersecting the diagonal line with F ). We either identify two stable and one unstable fixed points, or one globally stable fixed point r * . Fig. 4A shows the value of the smallest stable fixed point min(r * ). We find a sharp increase in its value for certain values of 0.2 a 0.3 and p 0.5 hinting at a saddle-node bifurcation. in Fig. 4B,C) . Notably, the model shows hysteresis also within a band of possible microthresholds, Fig. 4D ).
In summary, our model conceptually shows what has formerly been termed social tipping, i.e., a process where for a given population a small change in the size of a dedicated minority can have a large effect 18,20,47 . In our specific case, for a given value of a or p a small change in the respective other parameter suffices to largely increase (or decrease) the share of finally acting individuals r * . In addition, once tipped, the system sustains its state of high (low) shares of acting individuals r * even if a or p were to be reduced (increased) again.
III. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
We have proposed a refined version of the original Granovetter threshold model 32 that addresses a set of issues that, so far, have hindered its application as a conceptual modeling tool. Specifically, we propose to divide the considered population of size N into three classes (certainly, potentially, and certainly not acting individuals) of different sizes A ≤ P , P ≤ N , and N − P . In addition, we propose a threshold distribution that emerges from microscopic interactions between individuals on a social network. This distribution solely depends on the average connectivity K of individuals and a common micro-threshold to join into an action given that their individual preferences and attitudes are already favourable with respect to that action. The four parameters of our refined model are of intuitive nature and allow for a systematic evaluation of its dynamics in terms of a bifurcation analysis (except for K which only needs to be chosen sufficiently larger than zero, i.e., K 0, see Supplementary Information for details). As in the original threshold model, an estimation of the fixed points can be obtained by (graphically) intersecting the diagonal line defined by a and p with the emergent threshold distribution F . The three crucial parameters a, p, and all cause a saddle-node bifurcation which is a prototypical mechanism behind tipping points in many other systems, such as in ecology 48,49 or the climate system 50,51 , as well. It thus makes the model a promising tool to study the emerging field of social tipping 18,20,47 where little things can make a big difference 52 and minority groups can trigger large shares of a population to engage in collective action.
Our revised model describes multiple forms of collective behaviors, including social movements and crowd-like behaviors. For both such behaviors, norms are directly called upon to structure individual likelihood to engage in actions while also observing the actions of others around them. Importantly, there are differences in the speed of the process. For crowds the observation of social members is made relatively quickly, as are the decisions to participate in the actions. In contrast, these processes can be much slower for social movements. For both cases, however, we identify three time scales that are underlying our refined threshold model. We assume that the microscopic thresholds change at the slowest time scale (usually years to decades), as these are attributed to the unique identity of an individual (which may be less prone to sudden external shocks). In contrast, the classification into certainly The share of certainly acting individuals a could be given by those in the population that inevitably need to act, e.g., migrate as a consequence of climate change impacts 54,55 . For the average degree K it may often suffice to set it to a reasonable number, e.g., Dunbar's Number that suggests a cognitive limit to the number of people with whom an individual can maintain a persistent social relationship 56 (see Supplementary Information for details) .
The micro-threshold could then either remain as a free parameter of the model or be set to fixed intuitive points such as 50% (majority rule) or 20% (Pareto principle). Furthermore, the model also allows for changes in its parameters over time, such that r * can be estimated as a time-dependent variable, possibly causing the system to tip back and forth between its two possible stable states. In that sense the respective parameters can be incorporated into the system's internal dynamics as slowly changing variables.
Future work should concentrate on collecting data for the different parameters and then consequently test and calibrate the model against historical test cases. One specific challenge that lies within such an endeavor is the estimation of appropriate (relative) time scales at which the parameters and the internal variables change. In addition, appropriate early-warning indicators 51,57,58 should be applied to study the existence of precursory signals for the transgression of a social tipping point, i.e., bifurcation, in our model. Some of these indicators would require a further extension of the model such that individuals may also spontaneously become active with a low probability even if their micro-threshold is not transgressed (or vice versa). We further acknowledge that up to now a proposal for an emergent threshold distribution has only been derived analytically for the case of an Erdős-Rényi random network 59 . While this lays good groundwork, the threshold distribution should also be explored for topologies (such as scale-free 60 and small-world networks 61 ) that more closely mimic those of real-world social systems. Ultimately, the model should be applied as a conceptual modeling tool, e.g., to make qualitative statements on the possibility for social tipping with respect to issues of global change or sustainability transformations 12,62,63 under different scenarios.
IV. METHODS
A. Network cascade model
For the microscopic network simulation we consider an Erdős-Rényi random network 59
with N = 100 000 nodes and a linking probability of = 9 · 10 −5 resulting in an average degree of K = 10. We vary the number of certainly acting nodes A logarithmically between 1 and N and the number of potentially acting nodes logarithmically between A and N . For each setting of A and P (and fixed values of as given in Fig. 2) we create an ensemble of n = 100 networks and randomly assign P out of the N nodes as potentially active. Out of those P nodes we then randomly assign A certainly acting nodes. The model then runs in discrete time steps t. In each time step, every potentially active, yet inactive, node i becomes active if its share of active neighbors exceeds the micro-threshold . All nodes update their status synchronously at each time step. The simulation stops if the number of newly activated nodes at time t equals zero, i.e., if R(t − 1) = R(t). Note that our model is based on previous works that implemented a simpler version of a cascade model that did not account for a distinction in potentially active and certainly inactive nodes 26 .
B. Approximation of the emergent threshold distribution
The approximate emergent threshold distribution F in Eq. (3) is derived by assuming that for each individual i the number of active a i and inactive neighbors b i are distributed according to a common multinomial distribution, giving 
